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The UK won a major victory with the EU in the Draft EU-UK Christmas Eve Trade
Agreement: It got the EU to renunciate the so-called Ukraine mechanism which, in
effect, would have made the Commission the UK’s watchdog. This has caused some
“Brexit envy” in Switzerland as this mechanism is part of the Draft EU-Switzerland
Institutional Agreement. With a “bullshit” campaign, former Foreign Minister Didier
Burkhalter, however, has led Switzerland into a cul-de-sac, making it likely that the
negotiations will have to go back to start.
Approximating arbitration
The Union’s draft treaty with the UK of 18 March 2020 provided for an “arbitration
panel” in the event of a conflict, which would have had to request a binding ruling
from the ECJ whenever (i) EU law or (ii) treaty law identical in substance to EU law
was at issue. The ECJ’s ruling would have been binding on the panel. Under this
mechanism, the European Commission could unilaterally and at any time have taken
the UK to its own court, the ECJ. In the Draft EU-UK Treaty, however, a genuine
arbitration tribunal was agreed. In Articles COMPROV.13(3) and INST.29(4A), it
is even explicitly stated “for greater certainty” that the courts of neither side have
jurisdiction to decide disputes and that the judgments of the courts of one party are
not binding on the courts of the other. That such clauses were included in the text of
the treaty is extraordinary.
The provision on the mandatory involvement of the ECJ, that is part of the EU-
UK Withdrawal Agreement, was taken from the EU’s association agreements with
its eastern neighbours, the post-Soviet republics of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova
and Armenia. These countries receive large financial benefits from the EU. They
approximate their legislation to EU law and have limited access to the internal
market. Critics have, however, noted that the ECJ clause in these agreements goes
very far as regards sovereignty. The Ukraine mechanism is furthermore envisaged
for future agreements with southern neighbouring states, including former colonies of
European powers Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.
The Ukraine mechanism also remains part of the Draft EU-Switzerland Institutional
Agreement (“InstA”). The purpose of the InstA is to provide an umbrella for five
existing as well as all future EU-Switzerland “market access agreements”. The most
important existing agreements are the ones concerning free movement of persons,
technical barriers to trade and land transport. However, there the situation is a
bizarre one. InstA negotiations ended on 30 October 2018 and the EU urged the
Swiss Government, the Federal Council, to sign the treaty and ensure its ratification.
The Federal Council said that its negotiators had achieved 80% of what they had
sought. Nevertheless, it has been playing for time ever since. After a consultation of
major stakeholders, the Government requested “clarifications” from the European
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Commission on three side issues: wage protection in the context of cross-border
work, the relevance of the EU Citizenship Directive and the ban on State aid. At the
same time, it seemed to have come to terms with the institutional core of the InstA –
which besides the Ukraine mechanism includes the dynamic adoption of EU law and
a “super guillotine” on termination. The latter means that if the InstA is terminated,
all the agreements covered by the InstA end with it. The InstA would thus be virtually
impossible for Switzerland to terminate. In private law, one would speak of a gagging
contract.
The winding paths of Swiss EU policy
The Ukraine mechanism in the InstA has a strange history. Since 2008, the EU has
demanded that the bilateral agreements with Switzerland, traditionally administered
by joint committees, be subjected to a monitoring and court mechanism. Among
other things, the Union proposed that these treaties should be surveilled by the
EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”) and controlled by the EFTA Court. The EU
assumed that Switzerland would negotiate with the EEA/EFTA States Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway the right to nominate one member of the ESA and
one member of the EFTA Court in cases concerning Switzerland-EU matters.
If necessary, the EU would have exerted gentle pressure on the three states to
offer a hand. The technical term for this construction is “docking” to the ESA and
the EFTA Court. By way of docking, Switzerland could have retained its sectoral
approach to access to the internal market. However, under the influence of its
Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter, the Federal Council rejected this generous offer
in 2013 and decided to seek direct subordination to the ECJ. The Foreign Minister
was determined to set a “point of no return” on the road to EU accession. Other
members of the Federal Council had a mental reservation and merely agreed on the
assumption that one could give it a try. This would come back to haunt them.
With a “bullshit” campaign, Mr. Burkhalter managed to dispel the obvious criticism
that the ECJ would lack impartiality. (According to the famous definition of the
American moral philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt, “bullshit is “speech aimed at
persuading without regard to truth”.) At the centre was the grotesque contention that
the ECJ could not “sentence” Switzerland, but would only issue “advisory opinions”.
The key stakeholders agreed, but after three years of negotiations it became clear in
summer 2017 that the model with the ECJ would hardly fly in a referendum. Foreign
Minister Burkhalter threw his hat, something that only happens once in a blue moon
in Swiss political culture. His successor, Ignazio Cassis, promised to press the
“reset button” – something that could only mean “docking” – but then the European
Commission put the Ukraine model on the table. Mr. Cassis buckled, but he doesn’t
share his predecessor’s enthusiasm for the dominant role of the ECJ.
The impact of the EU-UK Christmas Treaty
The fact that the UK managed to avoid the Ukraine mechanism in its Christmas
deal with the EU had a huge impact on the Swiss debate. Some top politicians,
who had so far loudly supported the Ukraine model, took the view that the Federal
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Council should also aim to achieve what Boris Johnson (or his chief negotiator Lord
Frost) had succeeded in doing. InstA apologists, on the other hand, argue that it
follows from simple logic that the solution reached by the UK must be irrelevant for
Switzerland. Unlike Switzerland, the UK is not part of the internal market and thus its
industry has less access to that market than the Swiss industry. Unlike Switzerland
under the InstA, the UK is not obliged to adopt EU law dynamically. This, the InstA
supporters say, explains the absence of the Ukraine mechanism. It is normal for
the EU to claim a monopoly of the ECJ on the interpretation of EU law in the entire
internal market, i.e. also beyond the territory of the EU.
It should be noted here that the other post-Soviet states of Georgia, Moldova,
Ukraine and Armenia which have adopted the mechanism with the ECJ are only
obliged to “approximate” their legislation to EU law and have only limited access to
the EU internal market. The EU also knew that the UK wanted to leave the internal
market and yet it tried to impose the ECJ on the British almost until the very end.
The difference between the former Soviet Republics and the UK was just that the
latter was the stronger negotiator. It is easy to imagine how the InstA proponents
would argue if the EU had prevailed. The claim that the abandonment of the Ukraine
mechanism in the Brexit deal was dictated by logic is again “bullshit”, as described
by Harry G. Frankfurt.
The critical point it is not the ECJ’s competence to interpret EU law, but the claim
that even treaty law that is identical in substance to EU law may only be interpreted
by the ECJ. It is important to note that the EFTA Court has the right (and the duty)
to interpret EEA law, which is largely identical in substance to EU law. However, this
only works because the EFTA Court is a multilateral international court. The Ukraine
mechanism is painfully reminiscent of the “unequal treaties” that the Great Powers
imposed on Imperial China after the First Opium War of 1842. The main feature
of those treaties was the establishment of extraterritorial courts on Chinese soil
which had jurisdiction over foreign subjects in criminal and private law cases, and
sometimes also in mixed cases involving foreigners and locals. The proposed InstA
goes even further than these historic examples. It would give the ECJ extraterritorial
jurisdiction in conflicts between Switzerland and the EU, i.e. in inter-state conflicts.
What is more, the ECJ would become a kind of constitutional court of Switzerland.
That is all the more remarkable seeing that the Swiss Supreme Court lacks the
competence to review federal laws for their constitutionality.
I have described the genesis of the InstA with the ECJ model of the failed Foreign
Minister Burkhalter, and I have pointed to his bullshit campaign. His successor
Cassis, despite good intentions, did not have the strength to avoid the Ukraine
mechanism, which is only a camouflage of the ECJ model. Rather, Mr. Cassis
allowed his services, in yet another bullshit campaign, to claim that the “arbitration
tribunal” would have considerable competences. It is telling that these assertions are
not even shared by EU protagonists. In the summer of 2020, when the EU’s chief
negotiator Michel Barnier tried to impose the Ukraine model on post-Brexit Britain,
he only mentioned the ECJ. Numerous professors and legal practitioners from many
EU member states, from Norway and Iceland are tooting from the same horn. To
give three examples: When dealing with the Ukraine mechanism, the Norwegian
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professor Mads Andenas speaks of a “poor man’s EEA”, the Luxembourg business
lawyer Joë Lemmer of the ECJ concealed within a Trojan horse and Dutch professor
Dimitry Kochenov of incompatibility with the values of the international community.
Most importantly, contrary to popular belief, there can no longer be any talk of
“corporate Switzerland” pushing for the InstA. A new committee of entrepreneurs,
remarkably made up of exporters, called “autonomiesuisse” in contrast to the InstA-
friendly business organisation “economiesuisse”, is fighting the present InstA draft
with great vigour.
Two options with the same consequence
The Swiss are a shrewd people. The Federal Council’s tactic could be to sign off on
EU concessions concerning the three side issues – wage protection in the context of
cross-border work, the relevance of the EU Citizenship Directive and the prohibition
of state aid – in order to save face vis-à-vis Brussels. This would pass the hot
potato on to Parliament. If Parliament votes yes, there will likely be a mandatory
referendum, requiring a double majority of the voters and of the cantons. The InstA
supporters have been purporting that the majority of the cantons will not be required.
However, in view of two precedents, the votes on the Free Trade Agreement with
the EEC of 1972 and on the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 1992,
this cannot seriously be doubted. In light of the general mood, it cannot be ruled
out that the InstA would be rejected in a referendum. On the other hand, the EU
could also be unwilling to accommodate Switzerland on the three side issues. In that
case, the Federal Council would have no choice but to stop the negotiations. In both
constellations, as in the Monopoly game, the Federal Council would have to go back
to the start. Realistically, two options would then present themselves: Docking with
the ESA and the EFTA Court or negotiating a trade agreement without institutions.
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